In stake-based voting, one agent with 51%+ may become a dictator with full control. We aim to ensure voting power is proportional to staked deposits. It is critical for Cardano's Voltaire phase.
This is the total amount allocated to Proportionality in Stake-based Voting.
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Manvir Schneider, manvir.schneider@gmail.com
Yuzhe Zhang, yuzhe.zhang@data61.csiro.au
Davide Grossi, d.grossi@rug.nl
We plan to create a voting system that adjusts vote weight based on stake ownership, ensuring proportional fairness (i.e., aligning voting power with the amount of stake held).
No dependencies.
Our project outcomes will be an open-released research paper (via preprint platforms such as arXiv, eprint, etc.) together with its open-sourced codes (via Github) used for our simulation and evaluation.
The license could be OSS license and cc by 4.0, which gives recipients maximum freedom to do what they want with the work of the licensor. The source will also be under public domain even
[Problem statement and its big threat to communities]
Our solution in this proposal aims to address the critical issue of disproportionate influence held by large stakeholders in PoS voting systems (e.g., Cardano in Voltaire phase), a sector capitalizing over US$300 billion. Currently, a minority with significant stakes (in extreme cases, even a single voter holding more than 51% of the votes) can control the outcome (i.e., voting power equals 100%), which severely undermines decentralization.
Specifically, the concentration of power threatens the integrity of the entire blockchain ecosystem, with particularly damaging consequences in high-stakes governance decisions such as protocol upgrades, forks, or project funding. In these scenarios, a few "whales" can dominate the decision-making process, sidelining smaller stakeholders and compromising the collective interests of the community.
A particular use-case is Project Catalyst: Large stake-holders can vote on their own proposals and win with high probability. Similarly, other proposals can be decided by their participation. This poses a significant threat to the integrity of the voting process.
We focus on such an overlooked issue.
[Our approach and justification]
Existing voting mechanisms in PoS systems fail to provide a fair distribution of power, especially in high-stakes decisions.
We propose an adjustable weighted quota voting mechanism designed to ensure proportional fairness. Our approach directly aligns each stakeholder's voting power with their stake size, preventing any single large stakeholder from wielding outsized influence.
Our approach leverages the Banzhaf power index to accurately measure a voter's actual influence on decision outcomes. By adjusting both the voting weight allocation and the required quota for decisions, we ensure that voting power is distributed fairly while maintaining the efficiency and effectiveness of the governance process. Our solution is underpinned by rigorous theoretical analysis and validated through practical simulations.
[Project engagement]
Internally, our project team consists of research fellows and scientists, each specializing in a specific subdomain crucial to this project, including blockchain technology, PoS protocols, voting mechanisms, game theory, and social choice theory.
Externally, we aim to actively engage key players within the Cardano ecosystem, including blockchain researchers, developers, and governance bodies. We may build a community-driven initiative that incorporates feedback from various stakeholders.
[Towards Governance]
Our solution can address centralization concerns within PoS governance, enhancing both the integrity and inclusiveness of voting processes on Cardano. By ensuring that voting power is proportionally distributed, we enable more equitable decision-making, allowing community-driven outcomes to better reflect the collective interests of all participants.
[Value to Cardano]
We address one of the core challenges in stake-based governance (overlooked for long-terms): the disproportionate influence of large stakeholders. Our proportional voting mechanism will ensure that all stakeholders, regardless of their stake size, have an equitable influence on governance decisions.
This will enhance decentralization, strengthen community trust, and increase participation in governance. All of those are vital for the long-term sustainability of Cardano.
[Masureament of success]
Quantitative metrics include:
Qualitative metrics include feedback from stakeholders, governance bodies, and developers within the Cardano communities on how the new system affects decision-making fairness.
[Exposure to public (Deliverables)]
We will share the results of our project through various channels :
[Why us?]
Our team comprises members with diverse backgrounds and expertise: Qin brings a robust understanding of blockchain and is deeply familiar with the Ethereum ecosystem. Their expertise enables detailed assessments of Ethereum systems and nuanced analyses, particularly regarding security and consensus protocols. Yuzhe excels in game theory and model building, making significant contributions to formalizing underground models. His expertise enhances our ability to develop and analyze complex models. Manvir possesses extensive experience in staking and staking power dynamics, offering valuable insights into both staking models and mechanisms. Additionally, he has a deep knowledge of Cardano. Davide specializes in reasoning and decision-making within groups, with a focus on modeling, analysis, and algorithmic support. Their active involvement across multiple domains including multi-agent systems, knowledge representation, computational social choice, AI & law, and computational argumentation. Notably, Davide’s interdisciplinary research (with blockchain) has been recognized with the Best Paper Award in the Blue Sky track at AAMAS'22.
In essence, stake-based voting mechanisms are closely intertwined with computational social choice and game theory. We underscore our robust background in this domain, supported by a wealth of prior experience and expertise.
[Steps and progress?]
We have already laid the groundwork for this project/reserach over the last 10 months (with biweekly updates), and plan to continue on it for another 12 months (covering the period of this project)
During the past 10 months, we made the following progress.
In the next 12 months, we plan to
Milestone 1: Theoretical Development of Weighted Quota Voting Mechanism
(6 months)
A: Milestone Outputs:
B: Acceptance Criteria:
C: Evidence of Milestone Completion:
Milestone 2: Simulation
(2 months)
A: Milestone Outputs:
B: Acceptance Criteria:
C: Evidence of Milestone Completion:
Milestone 3: Community Engagement and Feedback Integration
(1-3 months, slightly overlapped with the fourth stage)
A: Milestone Outputs:
B: Acceptance Criteria:
C: Evidence of Milestone Completion:
N/A
N/A
Final Milestone: Project Close-out Paper
(4 months)
A: Milestone Outputs:
B: Acceptance Criteria:
C: Evidence of Milestone Completion:
4 people in general + others (only when needed)
Dr. Qin Wang
P: Research Scientist at CSIRO Data61
W: https://qinwang.tech/
X:
G: https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=6jdTO0cAAAAJ&hl=en
Qin has been dedicated to researching blockchain-related technologies for over eight years. His research background covers the core protocol layer (consensus, structure) and application layers (e.g., NFT, stablecoins). He has two patents and led three draft standards (EIP5521, EIP7634, and IETF Gateway Discovery).
He serves as the project proposer role.
Dr. Manvir Schneider (Unpaid)
P: Research Scientist at Cardano Foundation
X: @manv_sc
G:https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=1N2L-skAAAAJ
Manvir has been doing research since 2019 and started working as a research scientist after completing his PhD in 2023 at ETH Zurich. His research focuses on vote delegation and staking. His team also won the 1st prize at the 2023 Ethereum Zürich hackathon.
He serves as the project co-proposer role.
Dr. Yuzhe Zhang
P: Research Fellow at CSIRO Data61
W: https://iamyoezy.github.io/yuzhe/
G:https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=p13e02YAAAAJ
Yuzhe received his PhD in Artificial Intelligence from the University of Groningen in 2023, where his thesis research focuses on liquid democracy. Now, his research interests mainly include multi-agent systems, computational social choice, blockchain, and causal inference.
He serves as the project co-proposer role.
Prof. Davide Grossi
P: Associate Professor at the University of Groningen (Bernoulli Institute for Mathematics, Computer Science and AI) and University of Amsterdam (Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics)
G: https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=nMKIVrIAAAAJ&hl=en
Grossi holds a PhD in Computer Science from the University of Utrecht (2007). His research focuses on algorithmic aspects of collective decision-making. He contributed over 80 scientific papers across several areas within AI and computer science research, including multi-agent systems, computational social choice, knowledge representation and reasoning, blockchain, and computational logic.
He serves as the project co-proposer role.
In one sentence:
Total Requested Budget: 150,000 ADA ~US$52,500 (rate at 0.35, 03/10/2024).
Budget breakdown:
A total of US$52,500
Based on the crypto exchange rate in Oct 2024, the cost equals 150,000 ADA.
Detailed costs:
Personnel
Research Candidate 1
Research Candidate 2
Research Candidate 3
Data Collection
Publication & After
The costs of this project have been carefully calculated to reflect the expertise required and the time commitment necessary for successful delivery.
The primary costs are allocated as follows:
The budget for this part is based on typical freelance rates for research scientists and blockchain experts, and aligns with the average wage in the countries where the team operates.
Our project offers excellent value for money.