Last updated a month ago
The catalyst governance model is not adapted to its core decentralised nature, it's rather similar to an average system towards increasing bureaucracy, low participation and inefficient accountability
This is the total amount allocated to Revolutionising Decentralized Governance: Empowering Communities Through the Catalyst Council System Praxis of Social Sciences,. 1 out of 5 milestones are completed.
1/5
Preliminary reseach
Cost: ₳ 21,721
Delivery: Month 3 - Jun 2024
2/5
In-depth Research and Framework Development
Cost: ₳ 21,719
Delivery: Month 6 - Sep 2024
3/5
Initial Feedback
Cost: ₳ 21,719
Delivery: Month 9 - Dec 2024
4/5
Final Drafting
Cost: ₳ 8,688
Delivery: Month 11 - Feb 2025
5/5
Final Output and Disemination
Cost: ₳ 13,032
Delivery: Month 12 - Mar 2025
NB: Monthly reporting was deprecated from January 2024 and replaced fully by the Milestones Program framework. Learn more here
Catalyst's adaptation to the most advanced system of decentralised governance produced from social sciences. Traced back to 1950, suppressed during the Cold War, it is the Arendt's "Council System"
No, to have any academic dependency extra funding will be asked not
Yes, Open-source/Open Access. The output of this research intends to build up on the knowledge of other academics, for which it is important to acknowledge their contributions publicly by citing them. As usual, I will not hold commercialisation rights.
This makes the outcome of the final product open to scrutiny, improvement and further development.
This means that the Council System could help to improve all and every single one of the Sustainable Development Goals as communities are empowered by its implementation while power is decentralised. Perhaps decentralisation appears in the social sciences as a mechanism to adapt and combat climate change, empower women, educate, etc.
>> SDG's (specific subgoals) SELECTION:
#proposertoolsdg
The adjustment of Catalyst to the decentralised " Council System".
Being the best decentralised-governance system in social science theory, it has not been implemented in nation-states of any political affiliation or as peace resolution over land disputes because the council system in itself is designed to challenge the formation of power elites.
The main characteristics of this system adaptation will include:
The application of Hannah Arendt's council system (AHCS) consists of multiple councils operating at various levels of the Catalyst ecosystem, each responsible for specific governance aspects. The councils could potentially be democratically/meritocratically elected and centralised at specific levels accountable to balance check mechanisms that ensure active community representation and active participation, yet it may not be applicable to all councils or all levels of powers:
Such a system is dependable on feedback loops that ensure renovation and avoid the formation of a bureaucratic system. Most importantly, because in the long term, this is for the community to choose. The research output is not about creating a decentralised catalyst system. Rather it is about ensuring the functioning of Catalyst as a permanent decentralised system open to choosing its development's direction by the community where power is not given just on the day of elections, or where elites will form, or where bureaucracies will form, or where path dependency will be incurred in future unchangeable policy problems, or any conventional problems of the average democracy.
Part of the research intends to find a minimum of constitutional parameters that will secure the permanent decentralisation and options for renovation of the system to differentiate from the current use of traditional democratic mechanisms where policy builds up over policy in such a way that bureaucratically hinders the well-functioning of the system.
The council system's adaptation will be adjusted and proposed to be implemented in the Catalyst ecosystem (phase 1) as proof of a model that could benefit other organisational models. The failure to implement decentralisation power approaches could lead to creating oligopolies of any kind, whether "whales" or institutionally accommodated bureaucrats. Even in the centralised institutions of Cardano, chances are for the formation of clusters of power that will disempower the community. Under the lens of social sciences, blockchain structures are not special because these are still being subjected to human nature. The council system works as a mechanism of balance of power in such a manner that it will not allow powerful stakeholders to unite as a monopoly but to keep each other in check.
It will have two components:
The main problem is that the Catalyst system is following a path of bureaucracy that carries the biases from the conventional notion of democracy, and there have been many proponents and even projects in development that have neglected several points of the human sciences literature. This translates into a loss of empowerment for the community as, increasingly, choices are narrowed to specific subjects for discussion or participation. This decreases the political freedom and action in which options are narrowed down because the active participation in decision-making of the community is not implemented widely due to the possibility of modifying higher levels out of the given scope of choice being limited by higher levels themselves.
Such mechanisms that limit participation are a malaise for the structural design of a decentralised system. However, there is a window opportunity that can work upward, starting from Catalyst, which is the focus of this research.
Other problems pointed out by social sciences are already present or could further develop in Catalyst, such can be addressed using Hannah Arends's Council System (HACS):
To effectively convey the research and create an effective decentralised decision-making structure using HACS, a structural map of the catalyst must be reconstructed, and the structural risks and implementation adjustments must be identified. Some structural adjustments include centralisation with power checks, prerequisites, feedback loops, election methods such as democracy, meritocracy, the establishment of independent bodies with periodical reviews or
(some solutions below can be replicated in other problems for which I will try not to repeat them)
The dictatorship of the majority: The most important example is the structure in which the majority of voters make decisions against their own interests in the belief that the chosen outcome is the best for the Ecosystem. This is perhaps the scenario in which voters have been influenced to vote for an incompetent project or led to vote by a leader into a non-significant usage of funds.
Solution: A system of meritocracy with engagement in deliberative democracy as well as discussions needs to be adjusted while it is accessible to scrutinise publicly and thoughtfully to refute or support initiatives, This includes the periodical public meetings, setting minimum requirements and reporting. There are already several mechanisms and procedures established for this deliberative methodology, which is extensive in the literature and can be enhanced with AI. (likely Phase 2)
The dictatorship of minorities: In this democratic case scenario, an elite of stakeholders get together to exert power over the decision-making process, choosing the outcomes that will benefit them the most and creating the circumstances in which they incrementally gain more power than creating a status quo. Perhaps in Catalyst, this is reflected in the situation where individuals or groups hold power and are deemed as experts, creating a reputation and the notion that they are the only solution, therefore consolidating power constant power in the decision-making of the ecosystem. These experts are already part of a structural mechanism for which lower levels have little influence. Moreover, this elite has the power to narrow down the options for the lower level to choose from, strengthening centralisation.
Solution: the HACS can create a mechanism that, at the constitutional level, will allow the redesign of how higher levels operate. This includes the feedback at the higher levels, the option to raise concerns from below and the duty to address them from the abode. This top-down, bottom-up approach mechanism is what the research intends to adapt to Catalyst, and it is not limited to periodical revisions, emergency plans, data processing, AI assessment of logic in deliberative democracy etc.
The one wallet, one vote problem & Voting power proportional to the tokens held: This allows the so-called Whales to have more decision-making power in the ecosystem, usually making decisions for their own benefit and not for the community as a whole. Under these dynamics, the individual that has more ada can create several wallets for which the amount of ada is directly proportional to the amount of power in the ecosystem. Although little research has been produced in Cardano indicating a relative success in voting diversity, the problem is becoming a classic issue in decentralised communities that could be exacerbated in the future.
Solution: it requires the research of the mechanisms in which a person is allowed to vote under a certain specific higher level of power. For the bottom base levels, a system of data analysis could identify when the distribution of ada has been made in such a way that it is controlled by one user using statistical approaches such as the friction between transactions, time stamps of voting, etc., that could identify this fraud. Although such developments may be in the process, this research will be enriched by such advances to identify possible break points in the system.
The unknowledgeable voter: Plato's allegory of the ship adaptation to Cardano will say that if Cardano were a ship, the captain of the ship must be the most competent person on the ship to lead the ship. Then this question that in a democratic system, a voter is who makes the decisions regarding steering the direction in which the ship is going, therefore the voter is the captain of the ship. Nonetheless, depending on the sphere of decision-making, the "one wallet, one vote" allows the unknowledgeable voter to make decisions that are incompetent for the goals of the community.
Solution: this includes the aforementioned solutions, although it is important to highlight that such mistakes happen partially because there is information asymmetry, meaning that the voter does not have all the knowledge to make an assertive decision for which this research intends to close that gap.
Regarding Multy Pool Operators: it is likely that several groups or MPOs collude to gain power in the decision-making or use their voting power to quench the voices of minorities.
Solution: This may contemplate several approaches and propositions. Nonetheless, the thesis of the research does not exclude that MSO will have optional increasing duties with its communities to keep them informed as well as other MSO's communities to raise concerns against them, this will cut information asymmetry, creating a vibrant state of engagement. Nonetheless, this is not a fact; such an outcome depends on the research. Such scenarios represent for Catalyst that the power of MSO colluding can be challenged as well to solve by resolution mechanisms.
The biggest homogenous group omits minorities regardless of the minority's assertiveness or its needs: Under this case scenario, there could be a situation in which several individuals make the same wrong decision while a minority group support a different assertive decision or simply minorities in the ecosystem that have great interest and interaction but are limited by income are taking out of the decision-making equation. This Democratic process of straightforward decision-making will allow the majority's wrong decision to be executed whilst not having the opportunity to present a minoritarian but considerably more assertive decision in the process, creating privileges based on resources that hinder a decentralised ecosystem that is supposed to benefit the whole planet. This is another failure of the Catalyst project, which is intended to be solved in this research. Then, creating mechanisms of inclusion focusing on the creation of opportunities for engagement in decision-making for minorities.
At the moment, many projects want to jump to the emptiness, making Catalyst a DAO's experiment without a framework rigorously studied by social sciences leading Catalyst to a certain fade of failure. Moreover, this failure path has been heavily recorded in history of democracies as well as proven in democracies fairly similar to Catalyst. The HACS has not been implemented in decentralisation technologies before, and it is the paramount decentralisation model structure that has become the most rigorous critic of modern democracies and the most undesirable for elites in democracies because its structure creates a mechanism in which the status quo has chances to be challenged if this democratises and disempowers the communities that it is supposed to serve. However, it is believed that strengthening governance reduces security and scalability, this research thesis proposes no conflict between the advancements of government while strengthening security and scalability because the domain of governance has a different nature, more reliant on structure, which being effective, can enhance security and scalability.
The solution requires research on the literature of social sciences' decentralised governance models, departing from Hannah Arentd's Council System (HACS) of governance, which is primary for the transition of the Catalyst ecosystem with chances of permeating further into the Cardano ecosystem to decentralised governance.
This research will contemplate the following subjects, yet it is not limited to them, and its application is not limited to the Catalyst ecosystem but can be extended to any DAO or decentralised community organisation off-chain, for which the research is proposed to be divided into two parts, one theoric that will serve other communities and the appliance and adaptation of this theory to Catalyst.
The research will develop a detailed framework for the formation, operation, and responsibilities of these councils at the initial architectural level to secure the ecosystem. This framework has to be designed to be adaptable from the highest level or as a constitutional building block, allowing for its evolution to be based on community feedback and participation as well as an assertiveness mechanism, then changing according to needs within the Cardano ecosystem.
The check of power and balances: The research proposes that following the System of Councils, it must be fundamentally adjusted to the different levels of the ecosystem. This implies that not all the ecosystem will have the same structure, it requires pinpointing the powers that will be in check balances, and these may work in several manners of management as well as in several fields, such as the classic creation of the judicial, executive and legislative power.
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A little of theory you may skip => => =>
(Its theory departs from the early check of powers of the French Revolution, where the judicial, executive and legislative powers were autonomous in criticising and intervening in matters when abuse of power was presented in one branch. But most importantly, as happened in the French Revolution with the communes, the United States during both revolutions or even the Soviet Union, at the early stages of these, decentralisation of power allowed the people to create momentum to the new systems, in such, people was empowered to discuss and organise themselves in a decentralised manner. Perhaps the communes in France took power over their own perimeter, in the US, the states each developed their own legislature over their own consensus, and during the Russian revolution the Bolsheviks created different soviets or workers' councils. Nonetheless, the force of creation stopped because these decentralised councils, under the argument of loyalty to revolution, ceased to exist when captured by the political parties, becoming the centralised ruling forces of power, again repeating what these were supposed to prevent. It gave birth to the creation of the republics, which constitutionally and intentionally removed the power of the people to make their own community decisions)
“incorporate the town-hall meetings into the Constitution, or rather their failure to transform them under radically changed circumstances…. The American Constitution provided a public space only for the representatives of the people, and not for the people themselves "(Lederman 2019, p. 53)
In “On Revolution”, Arendt (1990) explains that democracies such as France, Italy, Hungary and the US, as well as the early attempts of communist Russia to empower the masses, are at the foundational level defective endeavours, because these lack in their structures space for open meaningful political participation of the citizenry; Arendt argues these are root problems of political freedom in these systems for which her proposed solution is the model of councils at the low-level of power, although this council-solution systems come from these failed systems themselves; As explained before, Arendt detected that each system was born out of a revolution and that during those revolutions a spread distributed councils always sprout up enhancing democratic-political participation which also was the primary power source to consolidate these systems, for instance, the soviets (translated as worker’s council) in early Soviet Union, the revolutionary councils in Hungary or les communes in France (pp. 266-267) (Cardanos's Catalist is currently is such stage). Arendt inferred that Political representation at the council level decentralises power within nation-states, reallocating power to local communities that surges as a contrary manifestation to the old centralised forms of governments that deprive citizens of political participation and responsibilities, because these power structures tend to despotism that hinders the citizenry of enjoying more of their duties, rights and honours of the public political life (Lederman 2019, pp. 12-13).
Hence it is concluded as justification that, Cardano's government bodies are becoming slightly dominated by complex and impersonal administrative systems where decisions are made through a maze of rules and procedures, not by identifiable individuals, leading to what Arendt called "rule by nobody." Although the members of these bodies that sat at the decision board are identifiable in Cardano, the process of depersonalisation makes it impossible to identify who makes the decisions over what or what power dynamics run (this can be studied using the dimensions of power [Lukes} and hints of sociology by P. Bourdieu's structural analysis) at the moment This means no one specifically will be accountable for decisions but the system, which signals a state that is beyond risky for Cardano's Catalyst democracy.
This bureaucratization centralizes power, distancing decision-making from the people it affects members negatively, also reducing their public participation in the decision-making process. It will be ending up treating people more like numbers than individuals, leading to a sense of alienation from the community base. Also, the internal bureaucratic systems that are evolving in Cardano's Catalyst tend to become more rigid and resistant to change, making it hard to bring about reforms. This brings apathy and weakens the active participation necessary for a healthy decentralised democracy that intends to grow the ecosystem.
In addition, at the present stage, Catalyst is committing the same mistakes as all other democratic constitutions in which classical democratic problems are not solved but replicated from a system-transmission-information inherited from our conventional notion of what democracy opts to be, yet not solving other issues that may manifest as clusters of power that erode the system, such as the dictatorship of minorities and majorities, the solidification of constitutional norms that will be useless in the near future, the power vacuum of those more affluent money wise ETC.
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The system, one wallet/one vote, is at its core, irreparably compromised!
This research will have a multidimensional approach where power will be evaluated at the different organisational levels in current state of Catalyst. This implies the identification of these levels as well as the constitutional measures to implement power checks to newly created levels. This will ensure that a dynamic of decentralisation is always in place for decision-making because lower levels of power will have mechanisms to influence higher ones and are, per see, always more vulnerable. In addition, certain levels will need to implement a three-independent power dynamic where each independent power can have a voice of criticism or support in the field in which its performance is the best (those levels have not been identified yet). Perhaps this will prevent economic decisions from being made in the interest of a few and then affect the whole ecosystem.
This will require a mapping of the Cardano's Catalyst power/decision-making ecosystem, which could extend in the future, for the study of power dynamics that may require a phase 2 as well as permission from the Cardano Community, if done on a deep level. Yet an initial mapping can be done based on the philological study of Cardano's Catalyst with the information available (also called philological study).
The human component is important, so it must not jeopardise or result in the unemployment of current catalyst workers, but their wellness must improve.
One of the core mechanisms that will be implemented in the research is "the how" for securing decentralised power in the ecosystem by the creation of mechanisms of feedback. As proposed before, these mechanisms should be stated in the main constitution as a means for other constitutions to renovate themselves as well as to work autonomously. This may require novel practices of policymaking in which it is sometimes impossible to avoid monopoly given spatial restrictions, perhaps the HQ of Catalyst. However, monopolises can be made accountable by the feedback of users as well as the implementation of game-theory scenarios that enhance competition and innovation.
The research intends to produce an output in which participative democracy, as well as participators in their field of expertise, will be rewarded by its motivation and commitment to participation as an empowerment mechanism while not discouraging them from the votation of unknowledgeable voters by engaging in the deliberation of ideas, debate and argumentative dynamics, instead, it will allow the unknowable individual to participate gain experience as well as forming its own opinions by the permanent access to knowledge and the build-up of experience in the development process of the Ecosystem.
This implies that the system must have a mechanism for easy entry where knowledgeable voters are required in the decision-making of their field (it may potentially be solved by accreditation acquired by course competition, yet this comes with its own problems, which the research will clarify), while there is engagement with other less knowledgeable voters or recent entrants in the Cardano ecosystem. Such a solution poses the most difficult problem in democracy and meritocracies because it restrings power for voters temporarily. Nonetheless, it opens the doors for a permanent state of initiative engagement. Democracy as we know it elects politicians not based on what is best for the country but based on the politician's skills that effectively influence the most voters, even when the decision-making of this leader goes against the voters' best interest. The AHCS avoids such failure by harnessing the community's consent, deliberative democracy mechanism and accountability.
By remounting to the philosophical roots of what an effective democracy is supposed to be, this research intends not to limit the political power of the individual but to decentralise this power in such a way that power is not just exerted on the day of votation but at any moment using the decentralised tools that this research will propose.
References
Lederman, S. 2019, Hannah Arendt and Participatory Democracy: A People's Utopia, Palgrave Macmillan.
Arendt, H. 1990, On Revolution, Penguin Books.
This seed is capable of modifying the whole Cardano for its benefit.
This research will serve Catalyst Voices and Catalyst Ecosystem Accelerator communities because, in these projects, it is not clear how goals such as participation will work; rather, the literature critique under the social sciences will help to further develop these mechanisms since there is an extended literature on the AHCS decentralised government model.
It may be argued that blockchain has a new and different relationship among humans since decentralisation is at its core, this is a statement that I agree with. Nonetheless, decentralisation is not very good or evil, and when implemented radically, the presumption of how goals will be accomplished by achieving a critical mass of participation can be easily put into question when using sociological tools. Moreover, these are at risk of becoming dependent technically and operationally on groups or individuals that could narrow the participatory scope of the community, and for which this research is about their best interests.
Decentralization of Power: This research proposes to engineer a non-yet-developed solution for Catalist using Hannah Arendt's theories of decentralisation that arguably have not been used in democracies because they attempt to go against the status quo. Yet these are formidably theoretically and historically based on evidence. The most benefit will come from efficient decision-making for DAOs and other decentralised frameworks of governance. Moneywise, this represents a passive economic externality of efficiency improvement, not a net value in itself.
The first steps towards a constitutional framework for development that cannot frozen but it renovated and adjusted to time and demands: This research insists that the constitution of Cardano is inexorable, and so for other bodies of Cardano, including Catalyst, as it is one of the Cardano branches with more chances of interaction in the decision-making process, this signifies that this process of decentralisation is relevant for the development process of the whole ecosystem.
The appliance of Hannah Arendt's Council System (AHCS) is a novel appliance in blockchain systems that is supposed to thrive towards the empowerment of decentralization. This research intends to initiate a conversation that is currently out of the scope of any democratic leadership because it empowers the participatory base of the system in such a structural form that the status quo can be challenged.
Several aspects in which the community will benefit include:
Measuring the impact:
Metrics can be assessed after the research's implementation.
Cardano, as its founder believes, has, the most potential to create a democracy better than any democracy, yet since it is the first research of its kind in Cardano, its measurement is limited in the long-term, for which, if successful, phase 2 will be proposed since more research must be done over its findings once its application runs. Nonetheless, the paper published and the attention received can highlight some measurements:
Quantitative Measures:
Qualitative Measures:
Once implemented in Catalyst or different communities, surveys and feedback from the community participation and the implementation. Perhaps their satisfaction with the governance process, perceived fairness, and the level of understanding of the governance mechanisms, along with the open discussion of findings, state and directions of the research. This transition process hypothetically requires phase 2 since it is post-research and implementation, although this research is not dependent on the subsequent phase.
The impact will come as an externality of Catalyst for the community, for Catalyst, it represents the engagement in the dialogue with stakeholders such as Catalyst Voices and Catalyst Ecosystem Accelerator and the Catalyst team itself.
Sharing outputs and milestone progress:
About myself and my capability to deliver:
I will dox myself here on faith for the community... I was born in Colombia and moved to Australia when I was 20. I have studied structures since I was 18, initially empirically in every single work that I have had, the countries that I live in, the group that I have shared with, etc.
I finished a scholarship for the bachelor's degree in Politics, Philosophy and Economics (with a major in economics and two minors, one in political economy and one in political philosophy) I am a member of the Excellency Academy of Latrobe University. I also did seven extra subjects in sociology, politics etc, for fun, which may be equivalent to a small diploma. I have been a student representative for the faculty of Human Sciences for two years, and worked in a dozen reformation workshops for the Uni. I have a bunch of menial diplomas, including natural sciences, I did two years of electrical engineering and dropped out because I realised that my Nikola Tesla fascination is not related to the installation of the traditional network of energy transmission but to Tesla's philosophy. Nonetheless, I graduated as an electrician at age 15 and have been working since then. I am "neurodiverse" (for which I encourage Catalyst to include a minimum of disability considerations for future participants). Currently, I am postulated for an honours research year at La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia. I gained experience cofounding a decentralised org for social/political solidarity that has been running for ten years. Although I have not been involved since 2017 (for which, honestly, I do not deserve much credit because the community has run it), it has provided me with practical insights into decentralized governance. During the pandemic, I also served as a volunteer/staff member for RMIT University to restructure learning for the pandemic circumstances. I consider myself a curious and dedicated student.
My great concern is that Cardano has not paid attention to the problems that I highlight in this proposal, and as far as I know, I am the only one highlighting them recently, and I consider my proposal to be the only one of its kind so far because in my view there are not many human sciences related participants in Catalyst that have considered this indispensable option. There are many Catalyst proposals about Catalyst becoming a DAO, jeopardising the ecosystem in depth when not having a human sciences lens and playing a discriminated concept of decentralisation, and this is concerning. Decentralisation counterintuitively may be perceived as good, but it can become a wicked dogma. It is controversial itself when assuming pure decentralisation as the saviour as if it is always normatively positive for the wellness of the ecosystem (please see ETH...) Although Charles puts a huge emphasis on the importance of governance because it is a complex problem yet solvable, people living in a democracy do not understand how complex is a true democracy or how to create such a system better than traditional democracies when dragging our biases, for which I believe I can contribute using my knowledge and since I have dedicated a portion of my life to this problems and chosen my career precisely for that reason.
I do not have many personal social media because, as in by Elizabeth V. Spelman's book 'Trash Talks': the production of conspicuous material is rubbish that others consume out of the waste of our own time. Nonetheless, this is my slightly inconspicuous LinkedIn.
Is the Golden Key Academy of any help? This is wildly spread for 15% of top students.
Funds management:
Financial Management: All funds will be transferred to a dedicated wallet solely for research purposes that will be staked in the United Nation's Cardano pool for refugees (WRFGS Pool). Every single movement of the ADA will have immediate updates on expenditures, including detailed receipts, which will be published on the project's Substack page. Besides the platform, of Catalyst, this will allow the community to track and verify the use of funds.
Since I am in Australia, all the funds that are exchanged for fiat will go to my personal bank account in the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, account number: 11457540 (opened in Sydney) and using the exchange of swyftx.com for converting ADA to AUD, Swyftx is a registered and legal exchange under the Australian jurisdiction. (because Australia opted for not regulating crypto but exchanges then expelling exchanges such as Binance). This implies a fee conversion of 0.6%, which I cannot avoid.
I will also upload all of the project's Substack page's receipts regarding expenditures, which is also my concern since it is important to keep my taxes up to date.
Roadmap
Milestone 1: 3 Months Conceptualisation Research design - 225 hours work
Milestone 2: 3 Months- Detailed research and framework development 225 hours work or 30 hours/week
Milestone 3: 2 Months - Drafting, feedback, Revision 250 hours or 30 hours week
Milestone 4: 4 Months - Peer Reviewed Submission to free/open journal and dissemination of information 250 hours 31.25 hours work per week
: 3 Months Conceptualisation Research design
3 Months- Detailed research and framework development
Milestone 3: 2 Months - Drafting, feedback and Revision
Milestone 4: 3.5 Months - Peer Reviewed Submission to free/open journal
No promise, but I try to get comments from the most prominent exponents on the subject, which are Seyla Benhabib, James Muldoon (Research Associate at the Oxford Internet Institute and Head of Digital Research at the Autonomy think tank), Danielle Allen (Harvard), Patchen Markell, Bonnie Honig, Shmuel Lederman. It is absolutely vital to bring these minds here, after all, this is Cardano.
Phase 1 Conclusion: 15 Days
Summary Report (document)
Financial Report (document)
Reflective analysis, questions yet to solve (document)
Community feedback on diffusion (yet to solve)
I will be the coordinator and main researcher of this project. My linked
Professionals in human sciences who hold a valid PhD do the review before publishing.
All funding not used will go to Phase 2
I will charge 60 ada per hour, assuming that it can reach the lowest point 0.55 AUD
Milestone 1: 3 Months Conceptualisation Research design - 225 hours work or 19.79 hours/week
Total milestone 1: 21500
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Milestone 2: 3 Months- Detailed research and framework development
Total milestone 2: 17227.27 ADA
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Milestone 3: 2 Months - Drafting, feedback, Revision
Total Milestone 3: 18127.27
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Milestone 4: 3.5 Months - Peer Reviewed Submission to free/open journal
Total Milestone 4: 28354 ADA
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Phase 1 Conclusion: 15 Days:
With all the taboo that comes with it, I have to disclose that I am heavily neurodiverse, including dyslexia and Schizophrenia, for which I will need some tools that will enhance my performance and research this includes:
Chat GPT plus (more taboo) 359.98AUD / 0.55 AUD per ada = 654.5
Endnote (it is a reference management tool to keep papers organised), although if this can be covered for the university, these funds will go to pay the academics. Any non-used cost, including what I charge for myself, will go to pay those top-notch academics. then it is 200AUD /0.55 AUD (price of ada) = 363.63
Grammarly: Because it was painful and really, really difficult for me to learn to read and write, plus English is not my native language, it is Spanish. Most importantly, it has a plagiarism tool, which is essential in academic writing. Grammarly costs 359.98 AUD / 0.55 AUD per ada, AUD cancels AUD and we have a total for Grammarly of 654.51 ADA.
The total for these tools is 1671 ADA.
All the research and output craft will cost 86879 ADA in a year's time.
Keep in mind that the exchanges are heavily related in Australia, and the exchange rate is 0.6 % which cannot be avoided. Also, I cannot avoid taxes, so I may reserve to hold my ADA if the proposal is elected.
If you have any concerns or suggestions about how I can prove the usage of these funds, please comment without hesitation since it is essential to ensure the proper usage of this ada, open to face all scrutiny.
It will be better assessed in Phase 2 (or yet to be solved)
All decentralised bodies will benefit from the organised decentralised model yet it is difficult to put it in value money but as an externality of efficiency.
At the heart of this endeavour it is deep, groundbreaking research that will transform theory into praxis (practice). The project demands an intellectual rigour that justifies the investment because of the positive externalities that are translated into economic efficiency, so "money". The development of such a council system or decentralised participatory democracy will accelerate the ecosystem by solving the problem-resolution mechanism as well as flexibly rejuvenating governance structures, educating participants, and empowering them. This translates into positive externalities that eventually will be paid with Ada, so why such a price?
CPI 1694 will see itself benefit here the value is just immense.
It will permeate in DAOs as well, cardano has the biggest shot to implement decades of theories that have not been implemented in democracy because it challenge the status quo of democracy itself.
https://www.instagram.com/dann.roaa/